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 BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE1 
Amici curiae respectfully submit this brief in support of 
petitioner Mark Christeson.  
INTEREST OF THE AMICI 
Undersigned amici are non-profit groups who work to 
improve criminal legal systems and share a strong interest 
in ensuring that petitioners in capital federal habeas 
proceedings receive robust enforcement of their right to 
counsel. Death row inmates seeking federal habeas review 
are entitled not just to a body at counsel table, but to 
competent and meaningful representation. Nowhere is this 
right more critical than in capital cases, where prosecutors 
have chosen to seek execution instead of alternative 
punishments. Amici believe the District Court’s order here, 
and the Eighth Circuit’s decision affirming it, foreclose 
meaningful representation and set dangerous precedent. 
Should those rulings stand, capital post-conviction counsel 
would be precluded from supplying the vigorous advocacy 
their clients need by the very judiciary that acts as the last 
mainstay for constitutional review before possible 
execution. 
National Association for Public Defense. The 
National Association for Public Defense (NAPD) is an 
association of more than 14,000 professionals who deliver 
the right to counsel throughout all U.S. states and 
territories. NAPD members include attorneys, 
investigators, social workers, administrators, and other 
                                                 
1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici certify that no party’s counsel 
authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person or entity 
other than amici or their counsel has made a monetary contribution to 
the preparation or submission of this brief. Both parties consented to 
the filing of this brief. 
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support staff who are responsible for executing the 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, 
including regularly researching and providing advice to 
clients in death penalty cases. NAPD’s members are the 
advocates in jails, in courtrooms, and in communities and 
are experts in not only theoretical best practices, but also 
in the practical, day-to-day delivery of services. Their 
collective expertise represents state, county, and local 
systems through full-time, contract, and assigned counsel 
delivery mechanisms, dedicated juvenile, capital and 
appellate offices, and through a diversity of traditional and 
holistic practice models. NAPD provides webinar-based 
and other training to its members, including training on 
the utmost importance of providing vigorous defense 
advocacy in all phases of capital litigation. Accordingly, 
NAPD has a strong interest in the issue raised in this case. 
The Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice 
Center at St. Louis. The Roderick and Solange 
MacArthur Justice Center at St. Louis (MJC-STL) is a 
non-profit, public interest law firm that advocates positive 
reform of the criminal justice system. MJC-STL is the 
newest office of the Roderick and Solange MacArthur 
Justice Center, which also has offices in Chicago (at the 
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law), New Orleans, and 
at the University of Mississippi Law School. The Roderick 
and Solange MacArthur Justice Center was founded in 
1985 by the family of J. Roderick MacArthur to advocate 
for human rights and social justice through litigation. It 
has led battles against myriad civil rights injustices, 
including police misconduct, fighting for the rights of the 
indigent in the criminal justice system, and pursuing 
compensation for the wrongfully convicted. 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
(NACDL) is a nonprofit voluntary professional bar 
association that works on behalf of criminal defense 
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attorneys to ensure justice and due process for those 
accused of crime or misconduct. NACDL was founded in 
1958. It has a nationwide membership of many thousands 
of direct members, and up to 40,000 with affiliates. 
NACDL’s members include private criminal defense 
lawyers, public defenders, military defense counsel, law 
professors, and judges. NACDL is the only nationwide 
professional bar association for public defenders and 
private criminal defense lawyers. NACDL is dedicated to 
advancing the proper, efficient, and just administration of 
justice. NACDL files numerous amicus briefs each year in 
the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal and state courts, 
seeking to provide amicus assistance in cases that present 
issues of broad importance to criminal defendants, 
criminal defense lawyers, and the criminal justice system 
as a whole. NACDL has a particular interest in this case, 
having participated throughout the proceedings.  
National Legal Aid & Defender Association. The 
National Legal Aid & Defender Association (NLADA), 
founded in 1911, is America’s oldest and largest nonprofit 
association devoted to excellence in the delivery of legal 
services to those who cannot afford counsel. For 100 
years, NLADA has pioneered access to justice and right to 
counsel at the national, state, and local level. NLADA 
serves as a collective voice for our country’s public defense 
providers and civil legal aid attorneys and provides 
advocacy, training, and technical assistance to further its 
goal of securing equal justice. The Association pays 
particular attention to procedures and policies that affect 
the constitutional rights of the accused, both adults and 
youth. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case involves federal courts doubling down on 
the effective denial of counsel to a severely mentally 
impaired capital habeas petitioner on the eve of his 
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execution, thereby preventing the full and fair litigation of 
an issue that demands this Court’s attention: the role 
played by a petitioner’s mental impairment in determining 
whether equitable tolling applies to the statute of 
limitations for filing a habeas petition. This Court should 
grant the petition to address whether the denial of 
adequate funding in this case constituted a constructive 
denial of the right to counsel required by the capital 
representation statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3599, the Constitution, 
and this Court’s decisions—including the previous 
decision in this very case. It did, and the issue matters not 
only in this case, but in every case where attorneys 
represent indigent clients with budgets subject to judicial 
control.  
The issue is of heightened importance where, as here, 
federal habeas relief is the last, best hope for state prisoners 
to correct constitutional defects in their convictions. 
Robust federal review is especially critical in capital cases 
to prevent the execution of the innocent and to ensure 
fairness in sentencing. The process is so important, and so 
complex, that Congress codified the right to counsel in 
such proceedings in Section 3599.  
That right includes not only the right to experienced 
attorneys, but also to non-attorney members of the defense 
team such as investigators and experts. The right becomes 
meaningless if counsel cannot retain that assistance in 
order to take basic steps necessary for providing adequate 
representation. In Mr. Christeson’s case, those basic, 
necessary steps include retaining non-attorney team 
members to assist in the investigation, evaluation, and 
presentation of new and complex mental health evidence 
regarding the “severe cognitive disabilities that lead him to 
rely entirely on his attorneys” to his detriment. Christeson v. 
Roper, 135 S.Ct. 891 (2015). That evidence is critical to a 
full and fair hearing on how a prisoner’s mental 
impairments affect the balancing of the equities under 
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Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), in determining 
whether the deadline for filing a habeas petition should be 
tolled—including where, as here, original habeas counsel 
unconscionably allows that deadline to lapse by 117 days 
before ever visiting their client.  
Federal habeas counsel cannot conscript the non-
attorney team members required to assist in the 
investigation, evaluation, and presentation of such 
critically important evidence. Absent government funding, 
section 3599 counsel also are powerless to hire those 
critical members of the defense team. The absurdly low 
and unjustified budget order in this case denied the 
resources necessary to retain that assistance and 
constituted the effective denial of counsel. Such orders are 
dangerous not only because they put at risk the fair, 
accurate resolution of issues in capital cases; they also 
create unnecessary conflicts of interest by forcing counsel 
to choose between working on capital cases for no 
remuneration or focusing their energy on privately paid 
cases. Indeed, inadequate funding can be even more 
dangerous than the failure to appoint counsel altogether, 
because it gives the false impression that attorneys are 
working for the client, when in fact those attorneys cannot 
do their jobs. 
This Court’s precedents stress the importance of 
providing adequate counsel and adequate resources in 
capital cases—especially when, as here, the client is 
severely impaired and unable to contribute meaningfully 
to his own defense. This Court’s prior decision in this case 
thus acknowledged that the appointment of substitute 
counsel was required under the statute. The proceedings 
below flouted that order by effectively denying substitute 
counsel the opportunity to investigate, evaluate, and 
present the evidence necessary for a full and fair hearing 
on the central issues in the case.  This Court should grant 
the petition for certiorari, reverse the decision below, and 
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remand for new proceedings in which counsel receives the 
resources necessary to achieve that full, fair hearing.   
ARGUMENT 
The arbitrarily allocation of $10,000 for the litigation 
of the Rule 60(b) motion in this case, when Mr. 
Christeson’s attorneys had reasonably requested $161,000 
to support the investigation and presentation of mental 
health evidence directly relevant to central issue of 
equitable tolling, constituted the effective denial of the 
statutory right to federal habeas counsel. This Court 
should grant certiorari to hold that courts must provide 
sufficient resources for capital defense counsel to perform 
the tasks required of them. 
I. Section 3599 Requires, In Addition To The 
Appointment Of Counsel, The Allocation Of 
Adequate Resources To Litigate Capital 
Cases. 
In creating a mandatory statutory right to appointed 
counsel in capital habeas proceedings in Section 3599, 
Congress underscored the important role such proceedings 
play in “promoting fundamental fairness in the imposition 
of the death penalty.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859 
(1994); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000). 
This “right to counsel necessarily includes a right for that 
counsel meaningfully to research and present a defendant’s 
habeas claims.” McFarland, 512 U.S. at 858; see also Martel 
v. Clair, 132 S.Ct. 1276, 1285 (2012). 
Beyond this, Section 3599 expressly provides 
protections to ensure representation by highly qualified 
and effective defense teams in capital post-conviction 
proceedings. For instance, attorney members of the post-
conviction team must have significant past experience in 
both serious felonies and appellate practice. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3599(c). Such experience should not be compensated at 
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the rate of an intern or an entry-level attorney with no 
habeas experience. 
Section 3599 additionally embodies the idea that post-
conviction representation requires significant fact and 
mitigation investigation beyond that conducted by prior 
counsel at the trial or direct appeal stages. See 18 U.S.C. § 
3599(g)(2). Since counsel cannot conscript the assistance 
necessary to undertake such investigations, the statute also 
expressly contemplates the provision of funds necessary 
for retaining services of experts, such as forensic 
psychologists, medical professionals, and trauma 
specialists. Id. 
 At an absolute minimum, Congress contemplated 
that attorneys appointed to represent capital defendants 
both before and after conviction would abide by 
professional norms. This Court has long referred to the 
ABA’s Guidelines as “well-defined norms” for capital 
defense teams and “guides to determining what is 
reasonable.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522, 524 
(2003); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).  
The ABA’s guidance establishes without a doubt that 
adequate funding is a necessary prerequisite to effective 
representation. Competent evaluation of potential habeas 
claims requires counsel to review voluminous court 
records, often spanning years if not decades, and to be 
well-versed in what has been described as “some of the 
most complicated, dynamic, and at times inconsistent 
bodies of law that exist.” Michael Millemann, Capital Post-
Conviction Petitioners’ Right to Counsel: Integrating Access to 
Court Doctrine and Due Process Principles, 48 Md. L. Rev. 
455, 487 (1989); Commentary to Guideline 10.15.1, ABA 
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Capital 
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 913, 1085 
(2003) (“ABA Capital Counsel Guidelines”) (“providing 
high quality legal representation in collateral review 
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proceedings in capital cases requires enormous amounts of 
time, energy and knowledge”); Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”), r. 1.1 cmt. These 
heightened duties necessarily include not only advocacy, 
but also investigation, aided by appropriate professionals 
and experts.   
Mitigation specialists in particular, like the ones 
requested by counsel here, are critical members of capital 
post-conviction defense teams. See Guideline 4.1, ABA 
Capital Counsel Guidelines, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. at 952; Mark 
E. Olive & Russell Stetler, Using the Supplementary 
Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in 
Death Penalty Cases to Change the Picture in Post-Conviction, 
36 Hofstra L. Rev. 1067, 1076-77 (2008); Emily Hughes, 
Mitigating Death, 18 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 337 (June 
2009). Thus their retention is not a mere suggestion—it is 
the professional norm by which counsel’s effectiveness and 
reasonableness is measured. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387. 
Their assistance is especially important where, as here, 
counsel enters late after prior counsel’s abandonment of 
the client, and new evidence reveals the need to 
investigate, evaluate, and litigate complex mental health 
issues.  
Indeed, where a capital defendant’s mental health or 
intellectual capacity is at issue, the use of medical and 
scientific experts is essential. See, e.g., Brumfield v. Cain, 135 
S. Ct. 2269, 2275-79 (2015) (relying heavily on hard 
science, including medical evidence and expert reports, in 
remanding for hearing on capital petitioner’s intellectual 
functioning); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993 (2014) 
(“That this Court, state courts, and state legislatures 
consult and are informed by the work of medical experts in 
determining intellectual disability is unsurprising . . . In 
determining who qualifies as intellectually disabled, it is 
proper to consult the medical community’s opinions.”); see 
also Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381. Given this necessity, the 
9 
ABA Guidelines mandate that one member of the defense 
team must have specialized training on various mental 
health and psychological issues. Olive & Stetler, 
Supplementary Guidelines, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. at 683 
(Guideline 5.1).  
At the same time that counsel must meet heightened 
investigative and forensic demands presented by capital 
post-conviction cases, they owe a continuing ethical duty 
to provide competent representation to clients. See Model 
Rules, r. 1.1 (competent representation), r. 1.3 (diligence) 
and r. 1.4 (communication with client) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2002). Lawyers are subject to disciplinary action should 
they fail to meet this obligation, and they are responsible 
for making reasonable efforts to ensure that the conduct of 
non-lawyer defense team members conforms with the 
professional rules. See Model Rules, r. 5.3.  
Without the requisite funds, counsel cannot afford to 
satisfy their obligations to conduct an extensive capital 
mitigation investigation required by this Court’s 
precedents and ABA guidelines. At the same time, they 
cannot afford not to meet those unambiguous professional 
and ethical obligations. Thus, inadequate budget orders 
can create dangerous conflicts of interest that force counsel 
to choose between working on a low-paying or nonpaying 
case versus working on a paid case, with the possibility of 
covering overhead and keeping a practice afloat weighing 
in the balance. See Lawrence Fox, Capital Guidelines and 
Ethical Duties: Mutually Reinforcing Responsibilities, 36 
Hofstra L. Rev. 775, 780-81 (2008).  
The foregoing rules stem from a practical 
understanding of the importance of representation in 
capital cases. Indeed, federal habeas relief is particularly 
crucial to ensure compliance with core constitutional 
guarantees in states where public defense systems are at 
risk.  Missouri is such a state. The public defender system 
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is ranked 49th in the country for funding, its director filed 
suit to obtain funds withheld by the executive branch, and 
the Governor himself was conscripted to represent an 
indigent defendant. Matt Ford, A Governor Ordered to Serve 
as a Public Defender, THE ATLANTIC, Aug. 4, 2016, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/w
hen-thegovernor-is-your-lawyer/494453/. Thus, Missouri 
is near the top of the list for states whose capital cases fall 
through the cracks—creating a real risk that the innocent 
or undeserving will be executed. Without robust federal 
review, necessarily including capable counsel with 
adequate resources, that risk becomes both 
unconstitutional and, as a matter of policy, intolerable. 
II. The Lower Courts Arbitrarily And 
Unlawfully Denied Christeson Adequate 
Funding To Prepare His Motion. 
In this case, Mr. Christeson’s attorneys presented a 
proposed budget of $161,000 to the district court, which 
included funds for their investigation as well as for the 
time of non-attorney professionals including an 
investigator, a neuropsychologist, a neuroimaging analyst, 
and a disabilities specialist. The budget explained how the 
money would be used and why it was necessary. The 
district court denied it as excessive and allocated instead a 
total budget of $10,000, including any fees for necessary 
experts. See Dkt.#122, at 2. That number seems to have 
been chosen arbitrarily; certainly the district court 
provided no reasoned basis for choosing the number it did. 
That figure also was absurdly low in light of the stakes 
of the case and the amount of work required to prepare the 
motion. First, on a simple back-of-the-envelope basis, the 
budget would have paid for 55 attorney hours at the 
11 
prevailing Missouri rate of $180 per hour.2 There simply is 
no way that attorneys could review the voluminous case 
record,3 conduct the necessary additional investigation, 
and then prepare and file the motion in such a short time 
period. Even accounting for the fact that the attorneys had 
done some of this work prior to their appointment (in 
connection with the motion to substitute counsel), the 
budget would have been insufficient—whether or not the 
attorneys attempted to hire a single outside expert to assist 
them.  
But outside expertise was critical to the full and fair 
development, presentation, and hearing of new evidence 
that substitute counsel unearthed in this case. That 
evidence indicates that Mark Christeson’s severe mental 
health impairments warrant equitable tolling because they 
inhibited his ability to act in his own behalf by “pursuing 
his rights diligently” when prior habeas counsel failed to 
do so and because they contributed to the “extraordinary 
circumstance(s)” that prevented timely filing of the habeas 
petition in this case.  Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 
(2010).  Thus, the new evidence in this case raises 
extremely complicated questions of both fact and law 
regarding the effect of mental illness on the attorney-client 
relationship. Those questions include the appropriate 
allocation of responsibility under Holland for counsel’s 
                                                 
2 This is calculated from the rate of compensation in death 
penalty cases as of March 2015 (when the budgeting briefing was 
submitted to the District Court): $180 per hour. See 
http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/cjainformation (last visited 8/3/2016). 
3 Included in the record were 20 boxes of documents from the 
state trial and post-conviction proceedings that contained hundreds of 
pages of motions and transcripts from the seven-day trial as well as 
police reports, dozens of witness interviews and depositions, DNA 
and other lab reports, and appellate briefs. Tpp. 16, 20.  
12 
failures to investigate a mentally impaired client’s case, to 
communicate with that client, and to act on binding 
precedent that was literally right in front of their faces 
instead of blowing the deadline for challenging the 
constitutionality of that client’s impending execution. See 
Jonathan Atkins et al., The Inequities of AEDPA Equitable 
Tolling: A Misapplication of Agency Law, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 
427, 450-459 (2016) (addressing appropriate balancing of 
equities).  
To state the obvious, accurate resolution of the 
equitable tolling issue under Holland is impossible without 
full and fair development and presentation of evidence on 
Mr. Christensen’s mental impairments because there is a 
reciprocal relationship between the severity of those 
impairments and the injustice of forcing him to bear 
responsibility for counsel’s misconduct.  In the flexible, 
fact-specific inquiry mandated by Holland, more severe 
impairments should lighten the duty of diligence. See, e.g., 
Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010). 
Conversely, there is little dispute that disabled clients 
impose higher standards of responsibility on counsel, 
which increase the extraordinary nature of misconduct 
involving such clients. See Alabama Ethics Opinion RO-
95-03 (“every degree that … testimony and evidence 
proved a [client’s] less than normal mental and functional 
capacity … raises[s] by an equivalent degree the standard 
of conduct which the Court must require … in [counsel’s] 
dealings with the client.”); see also American Bar 
Association Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense 
Function, Standard 4-3.1(c); Mo. R. Prof. Cond. 1.14, 
Client with Diminished Capacity. 
  The budget order in this case ensured that accurate 
resolution of those critical issues would be impossible 
because that order prevented current counsel from hiring 
the trained investigator and mental health and disability 
experts required to develop and present the necessary 
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evidence.4 To be sure, every refusal to pay for an 
investigator or expert is not a constructive denial of 
counsel. At minimum, however, a district court should 
have to explain why a proposed budget is excessive or why 
an alternative budget reasonably allows counsel to 
undertake the investigation and presentation of evidence 
necessary for full, fair, and accurate resolution of the 
central issue in the case. 
The courts below did neither. The district court’s 
budget order was not just conclusory; it attempted to 
recast a funding order that effectively denied Mr. 
Christensen his statutory right to counsel as a mere 
“dispute” about the approved amount. See Dkt.#122, at 2 
(quoting Rojem v. Workman, 655 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir. 
2011)). The district court then sought to shield the budget 
order from appellate review. See Dkt.#122, at 2 (citing In re 
Carlyle, 644 F.3d 694, 699-700 (8th Cir. 2011) (Riley, C.J., 
in chambers)). The Eighth Circuit panel’s cursory review 
ignored both the denial of counsel and the resulting 
structural flaw that permeates these proceedings and 
creates the risk of wrongful execution.  
The panel then added insult to injury by asserting that 
“no lawyer is entitled to full compensation for services for 
the public good.” Op. 7 (citing Carlyle, 644 F.3d at 699-
700). This observation ignores the fact that Missouri 
banned conscription of counsel decades ago. State v. Green, 
475 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. 1971). It also wrongfully 
equates Mr. Christeson’s right of counsel with his 
attorneys’ request to be paid, thereby ignoring the 
consequences to the client that result from underfunding a 
                                                 
4 Presumptive fees for such services are $85-100 per hour for 
mitigation investigators and $200-375 per hour for mental health 
experts. See, e.g., United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit CJA Policy and Procedure Manual Appendix E (2015).  
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capital habeas investigation.  Moreover, even if one were 
to entertain the notion that courts can conscript lawyers 
into public service, lawyers cannot conscript investigators 
and other experts necessary to develop complex mental 
health evidence in a capital habeas case. By denying 
counsel the resources required to hire those non-legal 
members of the defense team, the lower courts effectively 
denied Mark Christeson a statutory right to counsel that 
implicates the constitutional rights to due process and a 
fair hearing. 18 U.S.C. § 3599; see Celestine Richards 
McConville, The Right to Effective Assistance of Capital 
Counsel: Constitutional Implications of Statutory Grants of 
Capital Counsel, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 31 (2003).  
III. This Issue Is Critically Important And 
Warrants This Court’s Immediate Review.  
The issue of funding for federal capital habeas cases is 
critically important and warrants this Court’s immediate 
review. There is an ongoing crisis in the capital defense bar 
due to a lack of qualified counsel. See, e.g.,Welsh S. White, 
Litigating in the Shadow of Death: Defense Attorneys in Capital 
Cases 4-10 (2006). Indeed, “[t]he lack of adequate counsel 
to represent capital defendants is likely the gravest of the 
problems that render the death penalty, as currently 
administered, arbitrary, unfair, and fraught with serious 
error—including the real possibility of executing an 
innocent person.” The Constitution Project, Mandatory 
Justice: The Death Penalty Revisited 1 (2005). 
The result is that the quality of death penalty defense 
and our system of justice are both suffering. Id. Capital 
attorneys are not taking the most basic steps necessary for 
effective advocacy. White, supra. Mr. Christeson’s original 
habeas counsel provide a vivid illustration of this 
phenomenon. The lower court rulings in this case will 
further chill quality capital representation by sending a 
clear message that courts can, with impunity, deny the 
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resources that are required to develop and present 
evidence in post-conviction cases.  The same message can 
only dissuade experienced and qualified attorneys from 
entering or remaining in this field.  
Decades ago, the ABA warned about this 
phenomenon its 1989 Capital Counsel Guidelines: 
Unreasonably low fees not only deny the 
defendant the right to effective representation . . . . 
They also place an unfair burden on skilled 
criminal defense lawyers, especially those skilled 
in the highly specialized capital area. These 
attorneys are forced to work for next to nothing 
after assuming the responsibility of representing 
someone who faces a possible sentence of death. 
Failure to provide appropriate compensation 
discourages experienced criminal defense 
practitioners from accepting assignments in 
capital cases (which require counsel to expend 
substantial amounts of time and effort). 
Commentary to Guideline 10.1, ABA Capital Counsel 
Guidelines (1989), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrate
d/2011_build/death_penalty_representation/1989guidelin
es.authcheckdam.pdf. 
Studies have proved those warnings prescient. For 
example, the ABA Capital Counsel Guidelines cited 
several studies which demonstrated an increasing 
reluctance by experienced counsel to take on capital cases 
in light of cost concerns. See Commentary to Guideline 
9.1, ABA Capital Counsel Guidelines, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. at 
986. One of those studies, out of Texas, showed that, 
“more and more experienced private criminal attorneys” 
were refusing to accept appointments in capital cases at 
least in part because of “the lack of compensation for 
counsel fees and experts/expenses and the enormous 
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pressure that they feel in handling these cases.” Id. (citing 
The Spangenberg Group, A Study of Representation in 
Capital Cases in Texas (1993)).  
Similarly, a survey of Mississippi attorneys appointed 
to represent indigent capital defendants found that 82% 
would “either refuse or be very reluctant to accept another 
appointment because of financial considerations.” 
Commentary to Guideline 9.1, ABA Capital Counsel 
Guidelines, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. at 986 (citing Ruth E. 
Friedman & Bryan A. Stevenson, Solving Alabama’s Capital 
Defense Problems: It's a Dollars and Sense Thing, 44 Ala. L. 
Rev. 1, 31 n.148 (1992)); see also Fox, Capital Guidelines and 
Ethical Duties, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. at 779-80 (under-
compensating lawyers and non-lawyers would impede 
ability to secure their services, “leaving only those 
desperate for work—but unqualified to handle it – willing 
to accept these engagements.”). 
The inevitable result of this thinning of the capital 
defense bar is that innocent people will be executed 
because they lack minimally competent representation at 
all levels of the judicial system. Currently, rates of 
exoneration among capital defendants are far higher than 
for any other category of criminal convictions due in large 
part to the greater attention and resources devoted to death 
penalty cases before and after conviction. Samuel R. Gross, 
et al., Rate of false conviction of criminal defendants who are 
sentenced to death, 111 PNAS, no. 20, May 20, 2014, at 
7230-7235 (estimating that 4.1% of defendants sentenced 
to death from 1973 through 2004 were the result of 
erroneous convictions). But as the strength of the post-
conviction review process fades, the risk of erroneous 
execution rises.  
This case provides an ideal vehicle to address 
precisely this issue. By granting certiorari and reversing the 
lower court rulings, this Court can send a clear signal that 
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federal courts must allocate appropriate budgets for federal 
capital defense efforts, and renew the bar’s incentives to 
take up this critically important work. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, as well as those stated in the 
Petition, certiorari should be granted. 
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